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Abstract  
 
This paper analyses how corruption affects firms’ ownership of intellectual property titles that relate to 
firms’ technological, organizational and further innovation efforts: quality certificates and patents. 
Using firm-level data covering 48 developing and emerging countries, we show corruption reduced the 
likelihood of firms seeking quality certificates. Smaller firms were more affected by corruption and 
benefited less from higher levels of trust in their business environment. Corruption did not have 
impacts on the quality certificate ownership of exporters, foreign- and publicly-owned firms. Firms’ 
machinery investments were also negatively affected. By contrast, we do not find effects on firms’ 
ownership of patents.  
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1. Introduction 
 Intellectual property (IP) titles can be a powerful tool for innovation policy in both developed 
and developing countries and by stimulating innovation they can shape countries’ growth prospects 
(Chen and Puttitanun, 2005, Maskus, 2000). This will be the case if IP titles incentivize the variety of 
domestic firms to invest in research and development (R&D) in view of producing inventions, 
facilitate firms’ access to external finance and support expanding the market base for firms’ 
innovations.
1
 Providing conditions for small firms to benefit from IP is particularly critical in order to 
expand the often very small group of innovators (Khan, 2005; OECD, 2014).
2
 However, as IP titles are 
granted and enforced by national institutions, their functioning will depend on the quality of 
institutions. Limiting corruption, i.e. the use of public office for private gains, is undoubtedly among 
the critical institutional framework conditions. It is strongly negatively correlated with confidence in 
public institutions (Clausen et al., 2011). A wide literature demonstrates that corruption has been a 
major obstacle to economic development, particularly via its negative impacts on productive 
investments including innovation and consequently growth (e.g. Murphy et al., 1993; Mauro, 1995; 
Wei, 2000; Aidt, 2009).
3
 Moreover, corruption may affect firms differently since the capacity to deal 
with the costs it imposes and incentives as well as “opportunities” for engaging in corrupt behavior 
differ across firms. Corrupt business environments may also have different impacts across IP titles to 
the extent that conditions for awarding IP titles give officials different “opportunities” to seek bribes 
with low risk of detection. Ultimately, with heterogeneous impacts, corruption may hinder the 
“democratization of innovation” - a widening of the group of innovators – as it imposes unequal 
opportunities for firms to benefit from the IP system.  
 The objective of this paper is to investigate empirically the impacts of corruption on the 
ownership of IP titles that relate to firms’ technological, organizational and further non-technological 
innovation efforts: quality certificates and patents. Quality certificates are formal awards certifying 
firms comply with quality standards that result from organizational and other non-technological 
innovations. Patents, by contrast, are legal titles granted to the creators of new inventions - where 
novelty relates to the state of the art in their technology field, capable of industrial application. 
Moreover, the analysis explicitly investigates whether corruption has negative “distributional” impacts 
by testing whether impacts differ for firms of different size among other firm characteristics. Our 
analysis draws on a sample of cross-country firm-level data drawn from the World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys across 48 developing and emerging countries for 2007-2011. In order to identify causal 
effects of corrupt business environments, our empirical methodology addresses two critical challenges: 
First, we identify a suitable objective measure of corruption faced by firms by using a unique measure 
                                                     
1 See Greenhalgh and Rogers (2010) for additional detail. OECD (2014) discusses contributions in the context of developing 
and emerging countries.   
2 Khan (2005) provides a historical account of how the institutional quality of the American IP system of the 19th century 
provided opportunities for non-elite inventors serving social welfare rather than the interests of any single group. This in turn 
facilitated wider contributions to socio-economic progress.   
3 Bardhan (1997) provides a more substantial overview of the early literature and the main arguments.  
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of corruption in firms’ business environment. The measure, obtained at the country-location and 
country levels, is based on the incidence of informal gifts or payments requested for business 
operations. It was used previously at the firm level by Svensson (2003) and Fisman and Svensson 
(2007) among others. Second, inferring causality from regressions of firms’ IP ownership on business 
environment conditions such as corruption is challenging due to a multiplicity of potential omitted 
variables that could drive results. In order to address such concerns, our results are obtained from 
regressions that account for an extensive set of firm characteristics and industries’ business 
environment conditions. The latter includes controls for access to credit, infrastructure quality, 
industry investment intensities, the availability of skills as well as the level of economic development 
and industry characteristics. We also introduce location, country and industry fixed effects. We are 
able to do so as firms’ needs for IP differ due to characteristics inherent to industries, notably 
differences in technologies used and in the importance of innovation (Cohen et al., 2000; ESA-
USPTO, 2012). We then estimate whether firms operating in industries that are relatively more in need 
of IP obtain less IP if they face more corruption. Our identification approach relates most closely to 
Aghion et al. (2013) who exploit differences in the intensity of patent protection across industry to 
investigate whether strong patent rights and product market competition are complementary in 
stimulating innovation.
4
   
 Our results show that corruption has negative impacts on firms’ ownership of quality certificates 
in industries with stronger IP needs. Larger firms are less affected than smaller businesses. Our results 
are robust to a variety of tests including the use of alternative measures of industry IP intensities, i.e. 
their need for IP, and of corruption. Moreover, we find symmetric effects of the levels of trust in 
business operations firms face; trust disproportionately benefits larger businesses.
5
 In addition, we 
show that corruption neither affects exporters nor foreign- and publicly-owned firms negatively. This 
is likely to be the case as these firms can insulate themselves more easily from the negative effects of 
corruption than others. Moreover, differences in “opportunities” for extracting rents by public officials 
affect how corrupt business environments impact on firms’ IP ownership and, more generally, their 
efforts to engage in innovation: We show that, differently from quality certificates, the evidence of 
corruption’s effects on firms’ ownership of patents is weak. IP offices grant the latter if the firms’ 
invention introduces novelty and shows industrial applicability. Those technology-based criteria are 
more clear-cut than those required for granting quality certificates. In consequence, opportunities for 
corrupt officials to seek rents without risk of discovery are higher, protecting firms more from abuse. 
The stronger effects of corruption on certificate ownership of services firms compared to 
manufacturers may also relate to larger opportunities for corruption. In addition, we find corruption 
                                                     
4 This empirical methodology has also been extensively used to identify effects of financial market development on firm, 
industry and country performance following Rajan and Zingales (1998). Other applications include Nunn (2007), Manova 
(2008), Chor (2010) and Chor and Manova (2012).  
5 Our measure of trust in business relationships is obtained by aggregating the average share of firms’ sales paid for after 
delivery. McMillan and Woodruff (1999) use this measure at the firm level to study the determinants of business trust; Karlan 
et al. (2009) focus similarly on informal borrowing arrangements by households to evaluate their theory of trust. 
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has significant negative effects on firms’ investment in machinery indicating that their implementation 
of process innovations is also affected. Finally, we show corruption did not reduce firms’ ownership of 
quality certificates in countries that use IP the least. We find no substantial differences regarding 
impacts for countries with increasing intensities in their use of IP. Corruption imposes similar costs 
across these different levels of development.  
 The paper contributes to several debates regarding innovation, corruption and development. 
First, to the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to document for a sample of firms in 
developing and emerging countries that corrupt business environments affect development prospects 
via negative and heterogeneous impacts on firms’ ownership of IP titles. That is, the paper provides 
evidence of an additional channel of negative impacts of corruption on productive investments: 
namely via its detrimental effects on firms’ efforts to innovate. The fact that smaller firms are more 
affected introduces an additional burden: it biases policy impacts of IP systems towards larger firms 
excluding a group of potentially innovative but smaller firms. Second, the paper introduces a novel 
identification strategy to investigate the impacts of corrupt business environments on an important 
indicator of firm innovation performance, IP ownership, by addressing the identification challenge that 
arise when analyzing impacts of institutions on performance. Third, the paper also contributes to the 
discussion on heterogeneous benefits from IP systems, which prevent the democratization of 
innovation systems by showing that differences in capacities of firms to deal with corruption are an 
additional factor affecting differential use of IP systems.  Fourth, the paper documents differences in 
impacts of corruption across different intellectual property titles, a factor pointing to the importance of 
differential “opportunities” for corruption to affect firms’ innovation activities. This provides insights 
for approaches to address the devastating effects of corruption on firms’ productive activities.   
 Various policy implications arise from our findings. First, we show that corruption is a non-
negligible barrier to an economy’s development of firms’ innovation capacities. It provides an 
additional motivation for policy makers to fight corruption. Moreover, the larger costs for smaller-
sized firms require efforts aimed at providing adequate framework conditions for those businesses to 
develop their capacities. Our findings indicate overcoming resistance within the business community 
will be critical to create effective business associations fighting corruption (Dixit, 2014). Finally, our 
findings on differential effects of corruption and, in particular, the weak impacts on patenting are 
relevant when it comes to designing solutions to addressing the challenge of corruption. They point to 
the value of setting up objective award criteria across public services provided to businesses as a 
means for fighting corruptions’ negative effects on firms’ investment in improving their productive 
capacities.  
 The paper builds on the literature on the impacts of corrupt environments on performance 
indicators at the cross-country level such as Mauro (1995). It differs, however, critically in its focus on 
firm-level performance and relates from that angle to several papers that have analyzed how firms’ 
payments of bribes affected their growth and productivity. Using data of firms in Uganda, Fisman and 
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Svensson (2007) find negative effects on firm growth. The finding is corroborated by evidence from 
cross-country data by De Rosa et al. (2010). Beck et al. (2005) show corruption problems negatively 
affect firms’ growth rates, particularly those of the smaller-sized firms. By contrast, Vial and Hanoteau 
(2010) identify a positive effect of bribery on firms’ growth for Indonesian firms in support of the 
“greasing the wheels” hypothesis of corruption. There is less evidence on other performance 
indicators, one exception is Ayyagari et al. (2010) who document how bribery correlates negatively 
with firms’ innovation performance, particularly that of small and young firms. They also find 
innovators are more likely to pay bribes than firms that do not innovate. One explanation might be 
that, differently from non-innovators, innovators require the public service of an operating IP system. 
This, however, is not analyzed by the authors.
6
 None of the papers consider the effects of bribery on 
firms’ ownership of IP titles. The papers also differ from ours in their focus on the effects on firms 
which were requested to pay bribes. While related, the latter is not equivalent: more corrupt 
environments will likely lead more firms to pay bribes than less corrupt environments but they will 
also affect those which were not given the “opportunity” to pay public officials illegally for services. 
This is likely since the illegal nature of the activity favors preferentially engaging fewer firms. 
However, it does not mean these firms were not equally affected by corruption in other ways. This 
often includes facing longer delays in the delivery of services (as those firms who pay bribes are 
privileged) or lower quality services (in the extreme potentially leading to rejection of even valid 
applications). Our approach also allows for a different identification strategy while at the same time 
controlling for potential measurement error (with some firms not wanting to report on bribery 
payments) and endogeneity concerns regarding firm-level indicators of corruption.   
 The paper also relates to the literature that has documented why smaller firms can be at a 
disadvantage when it comes to benefitting from IP compared to larger firms. Several types of costs can 
be particularly burdensome to small firms while large firms can benefit from economies of scale. This 
starts with registration fees related to obtaining IP, which have been shown to affect smaller firms 
while they are usually not an obstacle for larger businesses (EPO, 2010).
7
 Moreover, patents are only 
valuable to firms if they can effectively enforce these rights. For small companies, enforcement costs 
such as attorney fees, management costs and time required to deal with litigation, are an important 
challenge as these costs are not proportional to firm size. What is more, the size of firms’ patent 
portfolios can help avoid costly litigation by using cross-licensing strategies.
8
 Smaller firms are 
therefore at a disadvantage compared to larger firms. Another advantage that large firms have is that 
they can reach agreements more easily because of repeated interaction with their competitors 
                                                     
6 Ullah and Wei (2013) study the impacts of quality certification on firms’ growth and investigate whether corrupt businesses 
environments affect the relationship; they find this to be the case and evidence that in such circumstances quality certificates 
do not contribute to firms’ growth. 
7 This is even more challenging in developing and emerging country contexts where financial market frictions render 
obtaining financial resources to pay for IP application fees and related costs more substantial. Beyond financial costs, lack of 
available skills for filling in IP applications adds to the costs faced in the application process. 
8 In cross-licensing arrangements, IP owners grant licenses to each other for exploiting IP rights for parts or all of their IP 
portfolios. 
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(Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004). Moreover, the fact that smaller companies are less prepared to 
withstand litigation increases their risks of facing further litigation. In addition, lack of capacities for 
managing IP portfolios and negotiating those on markets for knowledge impose a sunk cost that 
disadvantages smaller entities (OECD, 2014). The “democratization of IP systems,” thus, has to face a 
variety of proven obstacles including also corruption, the focus of this analysis.  
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 
discusses the theoretical framework. Section 4 presents the empirical methodology and Section 5 
presents the results we obtain. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Data  
 Our analysis relies on firm-level data drawn from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES). 
The WBES collect information in each country on a representative sample of formal (registered) firms 
in the private, non-agricultural sector. The selection of firms in each country is done by stratified 
random sampling. These data have been widely used to investigate various dimensions of the business 
climate and its effects on firms’ performance (e.g. Almeida and Fernandes, 2008; Fisman and 
Svensson, 2007).
9
 The data are part of the new round of surveys reflecting improvements with respect 
to the earlier surveys of 2000-2006. Our baseline dataset includes information for a cross section of 
firms from 48 countries from the major world regions with different income levels, covering 
manufacturing industries and various firm size categories for the 2007-2011 period. The dataset is 
based on selected observations from the full 65,285 observations of the 2007-2011 data as our analysis 
is restricted to the group of manufacturing firms and requires observation on firms’ patenting and 
quality certificate ownership as well as on corruption. Table 1 summarizes the data coverage across 
firm size, years, and world regions. The industry coverage is varied representing, as is characteristic 
for developing and emerging countries, a relatively substantial share of food and beverage and also 
textile and garments producers. Most firms in our sample are from lower- and upper-middle income 
countries, a consequence of the data requirements needed for our analysis.  
 The surveys cover critical information on firms needed to address the question how corruption 
affects firms’ IP ownership. The data also provides substantial additional information on firms 
including on sales, employment, ownership type, and export performance as well as use of technology. 
Appendix Table 1 provides definitions of variables used for the analysis and baseline statistics for 
these variables. Regarding information on firms’ IP titles, the dataset has information on firms’ 
ownership of IP through patents and quality certificates. Overall, 9.6% of the firms in our sample hold 
patents while a larger share, about 24.5%, has quality certificates.  
 Second, the dataset also covers, differently from the usual firm-level datasets, information about 
business climate conditions including corruption, which can be defined as the “use of public office for 
private gains, where an official (the agent) entrusted with carrying out a task by the public (the 
                                                     
9 Dethier et al. (2011) provide a comprehensive overview of WBES.   
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principal) engages in some sort of malfeasance for private enrichment” (p.1321, Bardhan, 1997). A 
key advantage of the data is that it allows addressing three critical challenges that arise when it comes 
to measuring corruption. One challenge is that corruption is, as is the case for other illegal activities, 
often underreported particularly if information is collected from those benefitting from corruption 
(Banerjee et al., 2012). Moreover and more fundamentally, aggregate corruption measures may not 
adequately capture the specific dimension of interest for an empirical study such as ours since they 
seek to integrate a variety of different dimensions of corruption. For instance, differences might exist 
regarding the levels of corruption businesses and individuals face for different types of interactions 
with the public sector. We are, in our specific case, interested in corruption faced by firms as they seek 
to conduct business operations. Therefore, we need an indicator that focuses more specifically on 
corruption in firm-government relations. Finally, a critical challenge for rigorous quantitative 
assessments of corruption is that they need to rely on a fact-based definition of corruption so as to 
reduce well-known biases introduced by subjective perception-based assessments of corruption 
(Olken, 2009; Svensson, 2003).  
 We address the triple challenge by relying on a specific question asking firms whether they had 
to make an informal gift or payment to obtain an operating license.
10
 We obtain a measure of 
corruption of the business environment by computing the average shares of businesses that indicated 
informal payments or gifts were required to operate a license. The averages are computed at the 
region-country and country levels. Figure 1 plots the percentages of firms paying gifts for operation 
against percentages of firms with patents or certificates for different region-country contexts. The 
wider use of certificates compared to patents can be seen. Trendlines suggest a negative relation 
between higher levels of corruption and IP ownerships. There are, however, substantial 
heterogeneities. We are less concerned about biases reported due to the fact that the information has 
been provided anonymously by those affected by corruption (rather than those responsible for 
corruption). However, there might still be some underreporting particularly as some firms affected by 
corruption may be afraid to report it. The fact that we compute an aggregate measure of corruption 
helps reduce measurement errors compared to firm level indicators.   
 We also use information from external datasets on the intensity of IP used by different 
industries. We use historic information on US industry patenting, as obtained by Aghion et al. (2013), 
which place machinery and equipment producers as among most intensive sectors while food and 
beverages, textiles and basic metal producers are weak users of IP. As alternative measures of industry 
patenting intensity we employ an estimate for the United States for 2004-2008 as reported in ESA-
USPTO (2012). The sectors with strongest use of patents correspond to those identified already 
decades earlier by Mansfield et al. (1981) as most IP sensitive: a) drugs, cosmetics and healthcare 
products, b) chemicals, c) machinery and equipment and d) electrical equipment. Moreover, since the 
different types of IP protect very different inventions, we cannot rely on a measure of patent intensity 
                                                     
10
 These measures have previously been used at the firm-level by Fan et al. (2009) and Ayyagari et al. (2010) among others.  
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as a proxy for the intensity of quality certificates used by industries. Since we do not have comparable 
data to those on patents, we obtain, using the entire WBES dataset for which information of quality 
certificates is available, the share of firms in each industry who relied on quality certificates. 
Additional measures are used for testing the robustness of our results and discussed in Section 5.4.  
Appendix Table 2 shows IP intensities by industry used as part of our analysis.  
 
3. Theoretical Framework   
 
 Corruption can have a strong detrimental effect on growth through its negative impact on 
productive investments, including notably investments in innovation. Several mechanisms can induce 
such effects: First, corruption can reduce opportunities for innovation by diverting resources from 
productive public investments that would support innovation (e.g. infrastructure investments or 
spending in education) into private consumption (that of corrupt officials). Even if estimates of 
corruption are necessarily approximations, the overall amounts are potentially substantial particularly 
where tax receipts are low and requirements for productive and social spending substantial. The World 
Bank Institute estimated worldwide bribery to amount to USD 1 trillion per year (Sequeira, 2012). A 
second mechanism, however, imposes a much larger cost. This is the resulting misallocation of 
resources by firms away from productive uses including innovation and entrepreneurship activities. 
Murphy et al. (1993) argue that corruption will likely lead firms to invest less in innovative activities 
than in everyday production activities. That is because innovators require government-supplied goods 
such as permits, import and tax licenses and, in the case of start-up initiatives, a series of permits for 
operation that established producers no longer require.
11
 By increasing the cost of engaging in 
innovation corruption will likely discourage investments in innovation hampering in this way growth 
prospects. 
12
 Corruption itself might also, depending on social preferences regarding inequality, raise 
demands for redistributive policies and, in consequence, reduce investments in innovation (Alesina 
and Angeletos, 2005).  A critical public service for innovators is the IP system which can effectively 
support firms’ innovation activities (OECD, 2014).  
 It is worth opening a parenthesis to describe how the two types of IP titles studied here - patents 
and quality certificates - are relevant for innovation. The critical role of patents in supporting 
innovation and growth relies on the following well-known argument: Patents, granted by national IP 
offices, give their owner a set of rights of exclusivity over an invention, that is, a product or process 
that is new, involves an inventive step and is susceptible to industrial application. The patent holder 
can exercise some power on the market and charge customers a markup on the price. In the absence of 
this exclusion right, competitors who have not incurred any research costs could imitate the invention 
                                                     
11
 This is supported by evidence by Djankov et al. (2002), which suggests that entry of firms is more difficult in contexts of 
greater corruption. 
12
 Other investment options in innovation of lower value may then become more attractive. For instance, firms may adopt 
inefficient “fly-by-night” technologies of production because these have a high degree of reversibility to be prepared to close 
down if necessary as new demands from corrupt officials arise (Svensson, 2003).  
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and offer the good or service at a lower price than the inventor. This situation could deter inventions 
coming to the market in the first place. Patents can, therefore, improve the dynamic efficiency of the 
economy (OECD, 2009; Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2007).
13
 While patents are an output of R&D 
investments, they can also be seen as input to innovation as inventions are not yet at the stage of 
commercial use but offer opportunities for developing innovations.
14
  
 Quality certificates contribute differently to innovation than patents. They are awarded to 
firms that fulfil a set of quality standards. Verification is undertaken by various certification bodies 
called registrars that can include government laboratories, private testing organizations, firms that 
were early adopters of ISO, industry trade groups, and accounting firms (Anderson et al., 1999). The 
ISO 9000 quality certificate standards, one of the most widely adopted quality certification worldwide 
set by the International Organization for Standardization, are a series of international standards of 
state-of-the-art quality management system requirements. National standards bodies issued on average 
more than 1 million ISO quality certificates per year over 2006-2011 (ISO, 2013). These certificates 
are indicators of non-technological and organizational innovations defined as “the implementation of a 
new organizational method in the firm’s business practices, workplace organization or external 
relations” (OECD/Eurostat, 2005). They, thus, provide another picture of innovation activities.15 
Compared to trademarks – which give exclusive rights over the use of a sign, design or expression – 
quality certificates relate directly to firm-level innovation. Obtaining them requires firms to engage in 
considerable monetary investment (estimated at around USD 187,000 on average) and time effort 
(about nine months to two years) for firms (Guler et al., 2002). What is more, a wide management 
literature documents how holding quality certificates improves firms innovation capacities and 
performance (Diaye et al., 2009; Douglas et al., 2003; Terziovski et al., 2003; Terziovski and 
Guerrero, 2014). ISO 9000 certification is correlated with direct measures of product quality (e.g. 
Brown et al. 1998, Withers and Ebrahimpour 2001). There is also evidence of a positive relation 
between trademark and innovation activities (e.g. Schmoch 2003, Mendonça et al., 2004, Malmberg, 
2005, Millot, 2012).  
The nature of benefits to firms from quality certificates is to do with their role in addressing 
information asymmetries, which may, as described in the well-known example of the “market for 
lemons” (Akerlof, 1970), lead to the failure of markets to reward higher quality goods. Effectively 
industries concerned about the “lemons” problem have incentives to establish a certification agency to 
collect and disseminate product information, awarding quality certificates by a certification agency 
(Dranove and Zhe Jin, 2010). The ISO 9000 series has effectively operated as a signal reducing 
                                                     
13
 But they do so by reducing competition and increasing prices, thereby excluding some consumers. Customers willing to 
pay more than the marginal cost but less than the mark-up price cannot buy the good. This generates an economic 
inefficiency, a deadweight loss.  
14
 In fact, patents can support innovation processes, for instance, by serving as collateral for innovative companies to obtain 
credit to develop innovations. They may also facilitate access to public support by signalling quality of the innovative 
capacity of firms. 
15
 Millot (2012) finds for an analysis of French firms that trademarks, which similarly to quality certificates serve as market 
signal for firms’ innovations, are correlated with product and marketing innovation even when controlling for patent use, 
suggesting trademarks are a complementary source of information on firms’ innovation activities.  
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information asymmetries, particularly in sectors where it is more difficult for firms to signal the 
quality of their product (Terlaak and King, 2006). Quality certification has become a requirement for 
potential exporters, and signals quality and reliability to foreign buyers, value chain leaders, and 
transnational corporations seeking local partners and subcontractors impacts both local and 
international demand as a number of governments and private companies (particularly MNCs) require 
this certification from suppliers (Guler et al., 2002). However, while “marketing” purposes are critical 
motivations for firms to obtain quality certificates, firms also value process improvements - i.e. 
internal business innovations - associated with such certificates (Buttle, 1997).  
 Corruption can raise costs to obtain IP titles, either by imposing an additional fee or by 
reducing the speed at which applications are processed. Some of the differences between patents and 
quality certificates point to potentially stronger impacts of corrupt business environments on quality 
certificates than on patents: One reason is the nature of innovation they protect. Patents are exclusive 
and unique awarded to those first introducing technological inventions, which in turn can be the basis 
of future product or process innovations. Quality certificates, by contrast, are not unique to the firm 
but certify it has reached a quality standard that testifies firm-level non-technological innovation 
efforts. The criteria to obtain patents are generally more objective as they rely on demonstrating 
technological breakthroughs than those for quality certificates, which rely on a broader list of less 
clear-cut criteria. It will be easier for firms to denounce wrongful treatment by public officials where 
they can point to objective criteria their innovation fulfills. Consequently, it is more difficult for 
corrupt officials to demand bribes. Quality certificates will also require re-validation while once 
awarded patents cannot be revoked. The former may, therefore, provide a more long-term resource for 
corrupt officials than the latter. The fact that patents are awarded by the IP office only rather than by a 
diversity of national certification institutions raises risks of discovery of corruption.  
 However, arguments have been made to suggest that corruption can be efficiency-enhancing 
and help “grease the wheels” particularly in those developing and emerging contexts where 
institutions are less effective. Such rationale could equally be applied to the specific case of IP systems 
where the slow speed of processing of IP applications challenges the efficient operation of IP systems. 
A competitive Coasean bargaining process would lead to different firms negotiating priority 
processing for IP applications and should then lead to the most efficient firm to pay the highest bribe 
for priority processing (Bardhan, 1997). Empirical findings support this hypothesis including e.g. 
Méon and Weill (2010) and Vial and Hanoteau (2010). Yet, there are various caveats to arguing for 
efficiency-enhancing contributions of corruption. As corruption is an illegal activity there is 
necessarily secrecy involved, any agreements reached will not be based on enforceable contracts. This 
means that it is, in practice, unlikely that competitive bargaining processes can be set up with 
predictable actions once bribes have been paid (Bardhan, 1997). Moreover, efforts to avoid detection 
and punishment will mean corruption is even more distortionary. The “greasing the wheel” hypothesis 
emphasizes, however, that corruption effectively has certain aspects of a bargaining process. 
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Consequently, the characteristics of firms might well have some impact on how they are affected by 
corruption.  
 There are in fact several reasons why we would expect corruption to have differential impacts 
for differently sized firms to the disadvantage of smaller businesses. A first factor is simply to do with 
the capacity of firms to pay bribes: large firms might be more likely to pay bribes as they are less 
credit-constrained and might also have larger profits to pay for such additional expenditures. In line 
with this hypothesis, Svensson (2003) effectively shows how firms’ “ability to pay” is a critical 
determinant of bribery payments for a sample of Ugandan firms. A second factor is that there are 
likely to be scale benefits in bribing in that continued payments to officials could allow large firms 
wider access to various government services. It can also offer the opportunity to negotiate more 
successfully benefitting from repeated games. Specifically, repeated interaction might not only raise 
risks of corruption but also help reduce risks that bribery payments will not lead officials to the 
provision of services. Large firms are more likely to have repeated interactions as they are often older 
than small businesses and have more requests of government services as their volume of products is 
larger. A third factor is that large established firms might be more favored in corruption games as 
“collusion” with large firms can create “trusted” relationships with corrupt officials. This is critical for 
corrupt officials in order to ensure the bribery will not be revealed.  The large the number of firms 
officials receive bribes from and the larger the number of new firms, the higher will be the risks for 
corrupt officials. Moreover, search costs in identifying suitable firms can lead to collusion whereby 
preferential treatment is given to a selected group of firms, differently from a “competitive” bribing 
system.  
 In conclusion, corruption may affect firms’ ownership of intellectual property titles; with 
possibly stronger effects on quality certificates than patents. It might also benefit larger firms 
disproportionately. In the extreme, the “greasing the wheels” hypothesis might apply for the subgroup 
of large firms. Such heterogeneous effects of corruption impose an additional distortion by impeding a 
wider set of firms from engaging in innovation activities. In such circumstances corruption would 
benefit larger firms to improve their competitive position relative to smaller market participants. 
Heterogeneous impacts of corruption are possibly one of the factors explaining why a plot of average 
levels of corruption and IP ownership shows substantial dispersion (Figure 1). The much flatter line 
for patents may also point to weaker effects of corrupt business environments on obtaining the latter. 
Such effects will remain hidden unless they are specifically taken into account by the empirical 
framework. We will test whether this hypothesis is correct in our empirical analysis.  
 
4. Empirical Framework 
 The following describes a baseline approach to analyzing the impacts of corruption, which has 
been applied in the past at the country level to analyze the impacts of a variety of institutional 
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characteristics on various performance indicators (including for corruption e.g. Mauro, 1995; Wei, 
2000; Méon and Weill, 2010):   
 
                                                                                      (1) 
 
where IP is a measure of IP ownership (that is, either patents or quality certificates) of firm i in 
country c in year y, corruption is an indicator of corruption at the country level, X are sets of controls 
for firm characteristics while    are industry fixed effects and Z is a set of country level controls in 
year y, and   is the error term. Regarding firm controls, we will systematically account for 
employment, as well as research capacities by introducing a measure of the share of skilled labor, 
controlling for the use of foreign technology, a potentially important channel for access to technology 
in emerging countries, as well as another measure of technology capacities (which can also serve as an 
indicator of “connectedness”): an indicator on whether the firm has its own website or not. We will 
also control for firms’ labor productivity and for ownership status – whether the firm is foreign or 
publicly owned, to what extent ownership is concentrated and firm age. Finally, we control for 
whether the firm is involved in exports in all of our specifications.   
 In order to test for heterogeneous impacts of firm size we could then rely on the following 
simple set-up:  
 
                                                           
                                                                                                                                            (2) 
 
where size is a measure of firm size. We add the interaction term only as firm size – measured based 
on employment – is already one of the firm controls included in our specification.   
 A substantial shortcoming of the proposed analysis is that the set-up allows controlling for a few 
selected country control variables but not systematically as is possible for industry characteristics by 
including industry fixed effects. However, many country factors likely affect IP ownership ranging 
from features of IP systems beyond purely legal characteristics to countries’ levels of development, all 
of which can only imperfectly be controlled for by introducing a set of specific country control 
variables. The list of potential omitted variables that the corruption variable might be proxying for is 
large, and the explanatory variables to include a matter of conjecture. It is difficult to have measures of 
every conceptual country factor one would like to control for and degrees of freedom are naturally 
limited at the country level. Therefore, a critical element for identification requires introducing country 
fixed effects in our estimation approach. A further challenge is that a country-level indicator of 
corruption likely masks location differences that can be substantial. Whether or not the firm operates 
in the capital city can make a difference, for instance, in the extent to which a system of checks and 
balances that restrains corruption is in place. More generally the size of regional agglomerations of 
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firms will likely make a substantial difference that is not accounted for in aggregate country-level 
indicators but that do play a role in firms’ business environment. This is also the case for IP 
registration procedures as regional services will likely operate quite differently from centralized 
processes. Two different country examples illustrate such differences in services by location: The 
nature of IP services differs substantially across regions; particularly strong is the contrast between 
services provided at the IP office’s headquarters and those offered elsewhere in the country (OECD, 
2014).
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 In order to address these potential shortcomings we use an alternative estimation strategy. First, 
we choose a strategy that allows introducing country fixed effects and, in that way, address the omitted 
variables problem. We exploit the fact that the extent to which IP is used to protect inventions differs 
substantially across different industries. This is due to differences in technological progress and 
innovation dynamics across sectors. We then test whether firms operating in sectors that are relatively 
more in need of IP, are more likely to adopt IP if they face a less corrupt business environment than 
firms operating in sectors that rely less on IP. That is, we exploit variation across countries and sectors 
to isolate confounding factors at the country level. This approach has been used extensively to 
investigate questions on how financial constraints affect performance following Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) (see e.g. Nunn, 2007; Manova, 2008; Chor, 2010; Chor and Manova, 2012 for a recent 
application). A critical assumption for this identification is that there is a technological reason why 
some industries depend more on IP titles than others. That is, these industry differences persist across 
countries: If pharmaceuticals rely more on IP than textiles in the United States, this is also the case in 
other countries including emerging and developing economies.  
 Such an analysis is warranted as the use of IP varies across industries due industry 
characteristics including, among others, i) the speed of innovation cycles and ii) the nature of the 
invention and innovation.
17
 First, high turnover rates of inventions can render IP registration processes 
less valuable as, once granted, inventions might quickly be rendered obsolete by new inventions thus 
giving their owners only a very limited period for enjoying monopoly returns on their inventions. In 
industries where those turnover rates are particularly high other strategies beyond IP such as lead-time 
(i.e. competing to gain first-mover advantage on markets), secrecy or, what is related to the latter, 
complex design of products can be more interesting. The fashion industry is an example where 
                                                     
16 Since arguments can be made to consider country-level indicators of corruption faced by firms we will also conduct 
regressions at the country level as report in our robustness.  
17 Two other characteristics also have impacts on differential needs for IP across industries: the importance of complex vs. 
simple technologies across industries and differences in the distance from protected inventions to commercialised products. 
First, complex technologies (e.g. electronics) result in innovative products that are based on hundreds of patentable elements, 
whereas simple technologies (e.g. chemicals) will involve a relatively small number of patentable elements. Complex 
technologies require cross-licensing agreements to address potential challenges posed by so-called patent thickets. It is those 
technologies in-between complex and simple technologies for which patenting is potentially least attractive. Second, the 
distance from the product that is patented to the product that is sold on markets, and ultimately provides returns to companies 
for their investments, differs. In the case of pharmaceutical inventions, the patent specification corresponds to the 
manufactured product. In the case of engineering, the link between the patented invention and the innovation process is more 
complex, as incremental changes normally occur from the development stage to product release. While the former renders 
patents potentially more relevant, the latter might render IP useful to the extent that IP can provide financing to 
commercialise the product. 
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turnover rates are likely substantial; registering IP is in consequence less attractive. Second, industries 
differ in the type of inventions/innovations they produce. Those characteristics also shape to what 
extent patents and/or trademarks are relevant forms of IP protection or not. In that respect, the type of 
IP studied, whether it is patents or quality certificates, also differs and, therefore, the intensity of IP 
use has to be analyzed separately for different types of IP. There are also differences in that in some 
cases more innovations can be kept secret than others. For instance, process innovations more 
generally might lend themselves more to such types of protection. The need to signal product quality 
will also differ across industries, leading to differential industry needs for quality certificates. The 
differential reliance on IP across industries is also supported by empirical evidence for different 
periods and countries; one of the consistent findings is, for example, the strong reliance on patents by 
pharmaceutical and chemical industries compared to others (Levin, 1988; Cohen et al. 2000). We are, 
therefore, warranted to use the identification strategy specified above. A few papers in the literature 
have exploited the differential use of IP across industries. These include Aghion et al. (2013) and 
Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001). Branstetter et al. (2006) use a similar methodology at the firm level 
based on the observation that those relying more on intellectual property rights should respond more to 
IP rights reforms. 
 In order to ensure that we use an exogenous measure, we rely on a measure of patent intensity 
for the US economy, i.e. one that could be seen as a benchmark, used by Aghion et al. (2013). For 
quality certificates we do not have comparable data for the US economy. We use the average intensity 
of quality certificates by industry of the 63,205 observations available in the full WBES. As part of 
our robustness tests we check whether results hold for alternative weights used for both quality 
certificates and patents. Moreover, in order to overcome the challenge of potentially substantial 
variation in corruption across regions, we take advantage of the available data and define corruption at 
the location-country (3 and 4 below) and country level (3’ and 4’ below). Our modified baseline 
estimating equations are, therefore, the following:  
 
                                                                                    (3) 
 
                                                                                   (3’) 
 
                                                                (4) 
                                                                                                            
 
                                                               (4’) 
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where               is an indicator of the intensity of patent or certificate use for industry j. The other 
controls are as specified before with the addition of    which controls for region fixed effects (i.e. the 
type of location firm i operates in), and, importantly    , a control at the country-year level. It is worth 
noting that our approach poses weak endogeneity concerns: We are assessing the impacts of 
corruption at the region-country and country rather than at the firm level on firm performance. It is 
unlikely that specific firm performance drives corruption at this aggregated level. Nonetheless, we test 
in our robustness whether results hold when we instrument for corruption.  
 A challenge with interpreting estimates of    of equations (3) and their equivalents in (4) as 
causal evidence of corruption’s effect on IP ownership is that various determinants of comparative 
advantage omitted from the estimation may bias results. Notably, it may be the case that more IP-
intensive industries are not only likely to be more affected by corruption but also by shortages in 
skilled labor, reduced opportunities for accessing finance and, more generally, lower business 
development levels.  The level of investment undertaken may also shape IP ownership. In addition, 
industry conditions in specific country contexts such as the levels of competition, technology 
availabilities and productivity may shape impacts more specifically. To ensure we effectively pick up 
impacts of corruption we add in controls for firms’ business environment including factors relating to 
development levels and framework conditions.  Finally, we also add corruption at location-country 
level to pick up any other factors that might be picked up aside from those that affect specifically 
industries that heavily rely on IP.  Our final estimation model is, therefore, the following:  
 
                                                                          
                                                                                        (5) 
 
               (                     )                                        
                                                                                            (6)  
 
where IND_Int are characteristics of industry j and characteristic are characteristics of location l in 
country y, and Yjcy are characteristics of industry j in country c. The equivalent additions are applied to 
country-level corruption models specified in (3’) and (4’).  
 Finally, we apply the linear probability model for our estimations. Standard errors are clustered 
by country, location, industry and year and, for alternative regressions, by country, industry and year 
taking into account that firms’ IP ownership is explained by more aggregate measures of corruption 
(Moulton, 1990). Specific detail about the variables used for the empirical analysis is provided in 
Appendix Table 1.  
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5. Results 
5.1. Baseline Results 
 Panel A of Table 2 shows baseline regressions results implementing the framework described in 
equation (5). Column (1) includes a set of firm-level controls showing a negative significant effect of 
corruption on firm ownership of quality certificates. Regarding firm characteristics unsurprisingly our 
results indicate larger and older firms are more likely to hold certificates than their smaller and 
younger counterparts. This is also the case for foreign-owned firms and exporters. Moreover, more 
productive firms that use foreign technology are also more likely to hold certificates. Column (2) 
shows results if a set of controls describing firms’ business conditions and factors related to 
development levels in particular. These include the overall GDP per capita as well as industry’s 
competition, productivity and technology levels. We find for firms in R&D-intensive industries that 
operating in richer economies positively relates to IP ownership for a variety of factors relating to 
context and probably also differences in demand for quality certificates. We do not find industry 
characteristics to be significant, which might be partly as industry fixed effects control for general 
industry-specific characteristics already.  
 Moreover, column (3) adds controls covering critical framework conditions for firms: i) access 
to finance, ii) the availability of skills, iii) infrastructure conditions and iv) investment intensities. The 
evidence suggests that indeed credit availability as well as investment intensities have a positive 
effect. By contrast, we do not find significant effects for skills and power outages. Column (4) adds 
our measure of corruption directly and interacted with contract intensity. Column (5) includes the 
same controls but assesses impacts of corruption using a measure at the country rather than the 
country-location level. The result confirms findings shown throughout of a negative significant effect 
of corruption on the ownership of quality certificates.  
 Finally, Panel B of Table 2 shows results for patent ownership. In this case we do not find an 
effect of corruption. This indicates possibly few “opportunities” for corruption protect patenting 
activities of firms while they strongly affect the likelihood of obtaining quality certificates. We will 
test whether this holds when controlling for firm heterogeneity.  
 
5.2. Main Results 
 In order to test our main hypothesis, that the effects of IP ownership are in fact heterogeneous 
across differently sized firms firms, we present in Table 3 results of estimations of equation (6). 
Columns (1)-(2) show results for employment size, with corruption measured at location-country and 
country level respectively. Columns (3)-(4) report results estimating impacts for distinct firm size 
categories as in Beck et al. (2005). Our results indicate negative significant effects of corruption on 
firms’ ownership of quality certificates, with stronger impacts on smaller firms. Results for patents are 
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reported in Panel B. Our findings show a negative but insignificant effect of corruption on patent 
ownership confirming findings reported for Table 2.   
 Regarding the magnitude of impacts, an increase of corruption by one-standard deviation (i.e. a 
decrease in the composite measure of 0.25) would lead to a reduction in the share of firms holding 
quality certificates ranging from 6.3% to 7.3% for the estimates of columns (1) and (2) respectively. 
As larger firms face fewer obstacles from corruption, for a given average firm size those effects are 
reduced to by 2.4% (column (1)) to 3.5% (column (2)), all else constant. For patents, the 
corresponding decrease (of 0.02 for the composite measure) is of less than 1% for estimates of column 
(1) and slightly above the value for column (2), with offsetting effects with average firm size.   
 
5.3. Robustness 
 Panel A of Table 4 presents results of several robustness checks of our results on quality 
certificates. First, we test whether findings are robust to the use of alternative measures of corruption. 
In column (1) as an alternative to our measure of corruption we use a widely used country-level 
indicator of corruption: Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. Our results are 
qualitatively maintained. The same holds for results shown in column (2) where corruption is 
measured based on firms’ perception of corruption as an obstacle to their current business operations. 
A major disadvantage of this indicator is that it is highly subjective. For this reason we prefer to rely 
on our chosen measure of corruption to assess the impacts of corruption. .  
 Second, we test the other component of our variable of interest: the measures of industry IP 
intensities used in our estimation. We use a measure of industry R&D-intensity, an alternative proxy 
for differences in industries’ innovation intensities and, thus, their need for IP to protect those 
innovations, and find as shown in column (3) similarly a negative effect of corruption particularly for 
smaller businesses. We also use another industry weight, which is based on differences in the 
trademark application intensity. Results, as shown in column (4), corroborate our findings. Third, we 
test whether our results are maintained using an alternative estimation method, probit and logistic 
regressions. Results reported in columns (5) and (6) show our results are robust to the use of these 
alternative estimation techniques. Fourth, we check whether our results hold for an alternative firm 
size measure, based on firms’ sales size rather than employment. Results reported in column (7) 
confirm main findings of Panel A of Table 3.  
 With regards to patents, while we find strong evidence on negative effects for the two 
alternative corruption measures, the CPI and subjective corruption index, as shown in columns (1) and 
(2) of Panel B of Table 4, we do not find supportive evidence for several of the other tests. Panel B of 
Appendix Table 3 shows similar findings hold for corruption measured at the country level.  
 Moreover, additional concerns might be raised regarding the findings regarding reverse 
causality and omitted variable biases. First, reverse causality might drive results. This would be the 
case if IP ownership had effects on corruption, for instance, if an environment where innovation, 
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reflected in high levels of IP ownership, is more prevalent affected opportunities for corruption. While 
possible if we think about innovation at the aggregate it is less of an issue in our context where we 
analyze how corruption measured at the country-location and country levels affects firm-level IP 
ownership. Notwithstanding, we test whether our results hold if we instrument corruption with a more 
exogenous variable to account for country-level corruption: We use a measure computed by 
Blockstette et al. (2002) which captures countries’ depth of historical experience with state-level 
institutions and scores according to whether governments above tribal levels existed, whether 
government was foreign or locally based and how much of today’s territory that was ruled by the 
current government. In order to avoid endogeneity concerns over controls, we have excluded them 
from those regressions (with the only exception of employment size used in the interactions). Results 
shown in column (1) of Table 5 show effects remain significant as before.  
 In addition, while our controls ensure we do not pick a variety of business conditions our results 
might be picking up other institutional shortcomings that may be correlated with corruption and be the 
“true” impact factor of negative effects on firms’ ownership of quality certificates. In columns (2)-(7) 
of Table 5 we introduce different governance indicators obtained by the World Bank to explicitly 
cover various governance strengths and/or weaknesses. These are, i) rule of law, ii) voice and 
accountability, iii) political stability, iv) regulatory quality, v) governance effectiveness as well as vi) 
control of corruption. We find our results are qualitatively maintained as those different controls are 
included, indicating it is effectively corruption rather than other institutional factors that drive effects.  
We find, however, governance effectiveness to have a positive significant effect. We also find our 
results are not affected by introducing a measure of the legal quality of trademarks, reported in column 
(8) of Table 5. The fact that we find corruption to have significant negative impacts once the legal 
quality of the IP system is controlled for (i.e. once the de jure protection is taken into account) 
illustrates a specific dimension how the actual implementation of IP (i.e. a dimension of the de facto 
protection) has substantial effects on firm IP ownership. Unreported results on patent ownership 
confirm weak evidence documented in Tables (3) and (4).   
  Overall, we conclude robust evidence on strong negative effects of corruption on certificate 
ownership and weak indicative evidence of effects on patents, probably due to the differential 
opportunities for corruption for quality certificates compared to patents. We also confirm small firms 
are more affected by corruption than larger businesses.  
 
5.4. Extensions 
Firm Characteristics and Quality Certificate Ownership  
 There might be other characteristics than firm size that drive the way corruption affects firms’ 
certificate ownership differentially. First, exporting firms – who often are among the leading firms in a 
country – might well face fewer challenges than other firms. One reason why exporters should be less 
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affected could be that these have larger capacities and resources to deal with corruption. Columns (1)-
(2) and (3)-(4) of Panel A of Table 6 show results separating the sample of exporter and non-exporters 
for equation (5). The evidence shows that the negative effect of corruption on certificate ownership 
only holds for non-exporters.  
 Another condition that might likely have impacts is firms’ ownership status. Firms that are 
foreign-owned may have a very different status from national business. They might, for instance, have 
privileged relations with host institutions and receive different treatment in consequence. Similarly 
state-owned firms will have very different relations with public institutions and might have a different 
level of exposure to corruption. We, therefore, split the estimating samples into two categories, foreign 
and public firms vs. private national firms, and estimate equation (5) for each group. Results for 
certificates, shown in columns (5)-(6) and (7)-(8) of Panel A of Table 6 indicate that it seems indeed 
the case that corruption only has a negative significant effect for private national firms but not for 
foreign and public firms.  
 Moreover, there may be a difference in effects depending on whether firms are operating in 
manufacturing or services sectors. Unfortunately, we do not have observations for several business 
environment conditions we control for. In consequence, for the comparisons across both sectors we 
omit them from the estimations shown in Panel B of Table 6. We find that both types of firms are 
affected by corruption, but the impact on services firms is somewhat larger (columns (1)-(2) and (3)-
(4)). In both cases, as shown in columns (5)-(6) and (7)-(8) effects are stronger for smaller firms. A 
possible explanation why effects are stronger for services as in those cases there might be wider 
“opportunities” for corruption as, differently from manufacturing, there is more scope for subjective 
evaluation of standards being attained and, therefore, it is harder to for firms to protest against 
corruption making it more likely.  
  
Impacts on Machinery Investment 
 The impacts of corruption on IP provide evidence of negative impacts of this type of 
institutional weakness on innovation. It is relevant to see whether negative effects also hold for other 
innovation activities those that are more widely accessible across firms in developing countries than is 
the case for patents, which require substantial R&D capacities few firms may have. Unfortunately, the 
dataset does not cover core innovation indicators such as firms’ R&D investments. However, the 
dataset provides information on firms’ investments in new machinery, providing information that 
relates closely to firms’ efforts at introducing process innovations. As shown in columns (1) and (2) of 
Table 7 we identify negative effects. Differently from our results for quality certificates, we do not 
find unequal effects across differently sized firms, as reported in columns (3)-(4) and (5)-(6).  
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IP Ownership and Trust 
 Another force that might affect IP ownership is the level of trust existent in a specific business 
environment. The effects of trust on various factors including economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 
1997) and financial development (Guiso et al., 2004) have been shown to be significant. The issue is 
related to corruption to the extent that the latter has negative effects on trust. As is the case for 
corruption, trust is a difficult concept to measure and has multiple interpretations. An interesting 
measure we exploit for this purpose is information on the average share of sales that firms are paid for 
after delivery, an indicator of the level of trust in contracts in a given context (        ). McMillan 
and Woodruff (1999) previously used the amount of trade credit granted by a firm as a measure of 
business trust. The rationale behind this type of measure is that firms will only allow for payments 
after delivery to the extent that they have confidence customers will not default on their payment 
promise. The idea to use “informal” borrowing relationships as an indicator of trust has also been used 
to measure trust in social networks (Karlan et al., 2009). Table 8 reports results for the following 
estimations for certificates where we adopt the same approach as in (5) and (6) but instead of a 
measure of corruption we include a measure of trust, aggregated in the same way as the measure of 
corruption:  
 
            (                )                                                                    (7) 
                                                                 
 
               (                )               (                )                                 (8)                               
                                                                                                                     
 
If we just test for the impacts of trust (i.e. (7)), they have a positive significant effect for quality 
certificates. Integrating interactions, i.e. equation (8), we find that trust has a stronger positive effect 
for larger firms as shown in columns (3)-(4). The same results hold using firm size categories 
(columns (5)-(6)). This indicates trust, therefore, is not a homogeneous factor either.  
 
Country IP Intensity  
 Finally, we explore whether and to what extent our evidence on negative impacts of corruption 
on the ownership of quality certificates differs across countries depending on how intensively the 
economy relies on IP. Results reported in Table 9 show differentiated impacts by splitting countries 
into quartiles of IP intensity use, proxied by the use of trademarks relative to population size. While 
we find no significant effect for the lowest quartile, our findings point to negative significant effects 
for all other country groups. This suggests that the intensity of IP use within economies makes little 
difference overall to the effects of corruption. In countries that use IP least intensively corruption 
seems to be a negligible factor with regards to IP ownership.  
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6. Conclusion  
 This paper documents that corruption thwarts firms’ innovation efforts, revealing an additional 
channel how corruption reduces development opportunities. The effects are heterogeneous and hurt 
smaller firms more than larger businesses while exporters and firms with foreign- or public ownership 
status are not affected. Corruption thus reduces opportunities for the democratization of innovation. 
Policies aimed at corruption are valuable as they help create an effective level-playing field for 
different types of firms. This is critical in emerging and developing countries that are characterized by 
“islands of excellence” which impose not only a cost on the distribution of welfare (Paunov, 2013) but 
also on aggregate performance (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). With regards to policy solutions, the 
heterogeneous impacts of corruption across firms identified point to an important challenge for efforts 
aimed at bringing together the business community to support anti-corruption measures. The 
difficulties involved in developing effective anti-corruption measures as part of government-led 
schemes certainly renders this a worthwhile effort (Dixit, 2014). Finally, the weak impacts of 
corruption on patenting illustrates that objective criteria in awarding public services to firms can 
reduce negative effects. They act effectively as deterrents for corruption by raising the risk of 
discovery, benefitting firms in their productive investments and their development prospects.     
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Figures and Tables  
 
Figure 1: Correlation of country-location averages of firms paying gifts for operating licenses and the share of firms 
owning patents or certificates (in percentages) 
 
Note: Percentage averages are computed based on the countries included in the estimating sample described in Table 1.   
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Table 1: Estimating sample characteristics 
 
Note: The dataset includes firm data of the following countries: a) for Africa from Botswana, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, South 
Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe; b) for Asia from Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Vietnam; c) for Eastern Europe and Central Asia from 
Afghanistan, Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, the Russian 
Federation, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Yemen; d) for Latin America from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
Industry information is based on the 2-digit ISIC Rev. 3 2-digit level. The income levels correspond to the World Bank’s country lending 
categories. 
 
 
  
Number of 
Observations
Region 
Africa 2,361
Asia 2,322
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 2,079
Latin America and Caribbean 4,567
Industry
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 2,460
Textiles 797
Garments 1,810
Leather 137
Wood 240
Paper 118
Publishing and Printing 293
Chemicals 1,089
Rubber and Plastics 746
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 729
Basic Metals 157
Fabricated Metal Products 1,180
Other Machinery and Equipment 525
Other Electrical Machinery and Apparatus 215
Radio, Television and Communication Equipment 34
Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-trailers 140
Furniture and Other Manufacturing 659
Size
Micro (1-10 Employees) 2,656
Small (11-50 Employees) 4,493
Medium (51-150 Employees) 2,246
Large (more than 150 Employees) 1,934
Year
2007 2,183
2008 797
2009 3,529
2010 4,166
2011 654
Income Level
High Income 1,171
Upper Middle Income 4,894
Lower Middle Income 4,287
Low Income 977
Full Sample 11,329
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Table 2: Baseline regressions of firms’ IP ownership  
Panel A: Quality certificates 
 
Panel B: Patents 
  
Note: Industry fixed effects are at the 2-digit ISIC Rev. 3 level. Region fixed effects account for whether the firm is located in i) the capital 
city or areas ii) with more than 1 million inhabitants, iii) with 250,000 to 1 million inhabitants, iv) with 50,000 to 250,000 inhabitants or v) 
with less than 50,000 inhabitants. Clustered standard errors clustered by country, location, industry and year for columns (1) to (4) and 
country, industry and year for column (5) in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Corruption
Corruption loc-country, y * Certificate Intensity j -0.097*** -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.072*
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.039)
Corruption country, y * Certificate Intensity j -0.130***
-0.0455
Firm Controls 
Employment 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Age 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Foreign Ownership Status 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.114***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Public Ownership Status 0.101*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.109***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034)
Ownership Concentration -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Share of Skilled Labor 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Indicator of Foreign Technology Use 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Share of Exports in Total Sales 0.104*** 0.108*** 0.111*** 0.112*** 0.111***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023)
Website Ownership 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.109***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Labor Productivity 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Controls for Business Environment Conditions
(a) Development Level and Industry Conditions
GDP per Capita country,y * R&D Intensityj 0.172** 0.147** 0.150** 0.138**
(0.073) (0.071) (0.072) (0.065)
Herfindahl Index 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031)
Intensity of Foreign Technology Use -0.001 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056)
Industry Productivity -0.015 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
(b) Framework Conditions
Credit Availability loc-country, y * Financial Dependence j 0.243*** 0.242*** 0.246***
(0.087) (0.088) (0.092)
Power Outages loc-country, y * Asset Tangibility j -0.527 -0.57 -0.499
(0.421) (0.414) (0.400)
Investment Intensity loc-country, y * Physical Capital Intensity j 0.429* 0.425* 0.434*
(0.251) (0.250) (0.254)
Skills Availability loc-country,y * Human Capital Intensity j 0.298 0.313 0.276
(0.208) (0.216) (0.218)
(c) Additional Controls 
Graftloc-country,y * Contract Intensity j 0.003 0.006
(0.029) (0.029)
Graftloc-country,y -0.011 -0.029
(0.029) (0.027)
Country-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,215 11,104 11,104 11,104 11,104
R
2
0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Corruption
Corruption loc-country, y * Patent Intensity j -0.077 -0.051 -0.006 0.066
(0.108) (0.112) (0.119) (0.148)
Corruption country, y * Patent Intensity j 0.057
(0.183)
Firm-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Business Environment Conditions
(a) Development Level and Industry Conditions No Yes Yes Yes Yes
(b) Framework Conditions No No Yes Yes Yes
(c) Additional Controls No No No Yes Yes
Country-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,882 5,850 5,850 5,850 5,850
R
2
0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
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Table 3: Main results: IP ownership, corruption and the effect of firm size 
Panel A: Quality certificates  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Corruption 
Corruption loc-country, y * Certificate Intensity j -0.252***
(0.052)
Corruption country, y * Certificate Intensity j -0.338***
(0.061)
Linear Size Interactions 
Corruption loc-country, y * Certificate Intensity j * Size 0.043***
(0.009)
Corruption country, y * Certificate Intensity j * Size 0.049***
(0.011)
Size Categories Interactions
Corruption loc-country,y * Certificate Intensity j * Small -0.123***
(0.039)
Corruption country,y * Certificate Intensity j * Small -0.186***
(0.045)
Corruption loc-country,y * Certificate Intensity j * Median -0.059
(0.039)
Corruption country,y * Certificate Intensity j * Median -0.114**
(0.046)
Corruption loc-country,y * Certificate Intensity j * Large 0.085*
(0.048)
Corruption country,y * Certificate Intensity j * Large 0.032
(0.055)
P-Value for Difference in Coefficients Small-Large 0.00 0.00
Firm-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Business Environment Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,104 11,104 11,104 11,104
R
2
0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34
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Panel B: Patents  
 
Note: Industry fixed effects are at the 2-digit ISIC Rev. 3 level. Region fixed effects account for whether the firm is located in i) the capital 
city or areas ii) with more than 1 million inhabitants, iii) with 250,000 to 1 million inhabitants, iv) with 50,000 to 250,000 inhabitants or v) 
with less than 50,000 inhabitants. Clustered standard errors clustered by country, location, industry and year for columns (1) and (3) and 
country, industry and year for columns (2) and (4) in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. Firm- and industry-level controls are the same reported in columns (4) and (5) of Table 2.  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Corruption 
Corruption loc-country, y * Patent Intensity j -0.082
(0.180)
Corruption country,y * Patent Intensity j -0.133
(0.224)
Interactions 
Corruption loc-country, y * Patent Intensity j * Size 0.039
(0.034)
Corruption country, y* Patent Intensity j * Size 0.051
(0.039)
Corruption loc-country,y * Patent Intensity j * Small 0.030
(0.147)
Corruption country,y * Patent Intensity j * Small 0.001
(0.184)
Corruption loc-country,y * Patent Intensity j * Median 0.038
(0.156)
Corruption country,y * Patent Intensity j * Median 0.031
(0.196)
Corruption loc-country,y * Patent Intensity j * Large 0.531*
(0.287)
Corruption country,y * Patent Intensity j * Large 0.608*
(0.354)
P-Value for Difference in Coefficients Small-Large 0.02 0.03
Firm-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Business Environment Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,850 5,850 5,850 5,850
R
2
0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
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Table 4: Robustness  
Panel A: Quality certificates 
  
CPI index Subjective 
Corruption
R&D 
Intensity  
Weights
Trademark 
Weights
Logit Probit Sales-Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Corruption 
Corruption Index country,y * Certificate Intensity j -0.167***
(0.052)
Corruption Perception loc-country,y * Certificate Intensity j -0.368***
(0.067)
Corruption loc-country,y * R&D Intensity j -0.216***
(0.082)
Corruption loc-country,y * Trademark Intensity j -0.005***
(0.002)
Corruption loc-country,y * Certificate Intensity j -0.895** -0.588*** -0.296***
[-0.155] [-0.173]
(0.411) (0.222) (0.100)
Interactions 
Corruption Index country,y * Certificate Intensity j * Size 0.065***
(0.009)
Corruption Perception loc-country,y * Certificate Intensity j * Size 0.085***
(0.013)
Corruption loc-country,y * R&D Intensity j * Size 0.037***
(0.014)
Corruption loc-country,y * Trademark Intensity j * Size 0.001***
(0.000)
Corruption loc-country,y * Certificate Intensity j * Size 0.268*** 0.152***
[0.036] [0.036]
(0.070) (0.038)
Corruption loc-country,y * Certificate Intensity j * Sales-Size 0.011**
(0.005)
Firm-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Business Environment Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,059 11,104 11,111 11,111 11,104 11,104 10,389
R
2
0.34 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.32
Pseudo-R
2
0.34 0.34
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Table 4: Robustness tests 
Panel B: Patents  
 
Note: Industry fixed effects are at the 2-digit ISIC Rev. 3 level. Region fixed effects account for whether the firm is located in i) the capital 
city or areas ii) with more than 1 million inhabitants, iii) with 250,000 to 1 million inhabitants, iv) with 50,000 to 250,000 inhabitants or v) 
with less than 50,000 inhabitants. Clustered standard errors clustered by country, location, industry and year in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Firm- and industry-level controls are the same reported for columns (4) and (5) 
of Table 2. 
 
 
 
  
CPI index Subjective 
Corruption
R&D 
Intensity 
Alternative 
Patent 
Logit Probit Sales-Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Corruption 
Corruption Index country,y * Patent Intensity j -0.331**
(0.136)
Corruption Perception loc-country,y * Patent Intensity j -0.699***
(0.201)
Corruption loc-country,y * R&D Intensity j -0.056
(0.068)
Corruption loc-country,y * Alternative Patent Intensity j -0.178
(0.223)
Corruption loc-country,y * Patent Intensity j -0.415 -0.237 -0.442
[-0.028] [-0.030]
(2.412) (1.223) (0.286)
Interactions 
Corruption Index country,y * Patent Intensity j * Size 0.099***
(0.031)
Corruption Perception loc-country,y * Patent Intensity j * Size 0.144***
(0.038)
Corruption loc-country,y * R&D Intensity j * Size 0.035**
(0.014)
Corruption loc-country,y * Alternative Patent Intensity j * Size 0.059
(0.046)
Corruption loc-country,y * Patent Intensity j * Size 0.202 0.122
[0.014] [0.016]
(0.429) (0.216)
Corruption loc-country,y * Patent Intensity j * Sales-Size 0.025*
(0.015)
Firm-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Business Environment Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,239 5,850 6,244 6,239 5,845 5,845 5,454
R
2
0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17
Pseudo-R
2
0.28 0.27
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Table 5: Additional robustness tests 
 
Note: Industry fixed effects are at the 2-digit ISIC Rev. 3 level. Region fixed effects account for whether the firm is located in i) the capital 
city or areas ii) with more than 1 million inhabitants, iii) with 250,000 to 1 million inhabitants, iv) with 50,000 to 250,000 inhabitants or v) 
with less than 50,000 inhabitants. Standard errors clustered by country, industry and year in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Firm- and industry-level controls are the same reported columns (4) and (5) of Table 2. 
IV Regression Legal IP 
Context
Institutional 
History
Rule of 
Law
Control of 
Corruption
Voice and 
Accountability
Political 
Stability
Regulatory 
Quality
Governance 
Efficiency
Trademark 
Legal Quality 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Corruption 
Corruption country, y * Certificate Intensity j -0.550*** -0.305*** -0.301*** -0.332*** -0.371*** -0.309*** -0.268*** -0.297***
(0.163) (0.071) (0.072) (0.065) (0.067) (0.068) (0.072) (0.067)
Interactions 
Corruption country, y * Certificate-Intensity j* Size 0.132*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.042***
(0.020) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
World Governance Indicators
Rule of Law country, y * Certificate-Intensity j 0.120
(0.110)
Control of Corruption country, y * Certificate-Intensity j 0.109
(0.105)
Voice and Accountability country, y * Certificate-Intensity j 0.024
(0.091)
Political Stability country, y * Certificate Intensity j -0.092
(0.061)
Regulatory Quality country, y * Certificate Intensity j 0.128
(0.112)
Governance Effectiveness country, y * Certificate Intensity j 0.267**
(0.125)
Trademark Index country, 2002 * Certificate Intensity j 0.063
(0.371)
Firm-Level Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Business Environment Conditions No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,111 11,104 11,104 11,104 11,104 11,104 11,104 8,944
R
2
0.23 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34
World Bank Governance Indicators 
Dependent Variable: Quality Certificates
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Table 6: Firm characteristics and the corruption-certificate ownership relationship  
Panel A: Exporter and ownership status 
 
Panel B: Services vs. manufacturing firms 
 
Note: Industry fixed effects are at the 2-digit ISIC Rev. 3 level. Region fixed effects account for whether the firm is located in i) the capital 
city or areas ii) with more than 1 million inhabitants, iii) with 250,000 to 1 million inhabitants, iv) with 50,000 to 250,000 inhabitants or v) 
with less than 50,000 inhabitants. Standard errors clustered by country, location, industry and year for columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) and 
country, industry and year for columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. Firm- and industry-level controls of Panel A are the same reported for columns (4) and (5) of Table 2. ’’’Firm-level controls 
included in regressions shown in panel B are employment and age, labor productivity, ownership concentration, website ownership, share of 
exports and foreign as well as public ownership status. Legal and industry-country controls include the trademark index, the logarithm of 
corruption at location-country level, industry competition and labor productivity.  
 
  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Corruption 
Corruption loc-country, y * Certificate Intensity j 0.109 -0.146*** 0.156 -0.120***
(0.071) (0.044) (0.111) (0.039)
Corruption country, y * Certificate Intensity j 0.128 -0.226*** 0.132 -0.180***
(0.082) (0.046) (0.122) (0.046)
Firm-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Business Environment Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,556 3,556 7,548 7,548 1,495 1,495 9,609 9,609
R
2
0.31 0.31 0.22 0.23 0.35 0.35 0.28 0.28
Dependent Variable: Quality Certificates
Exporters Non-Exporters Foreign and Public Firms Private National Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Corruption 
Corruption loc-country, y * Certificate Intensity j -0.265** -0.076** -0.407*** -0.249***
(0.115) (0.038) (0.126) (0.054)
Corruption country, y * Certificate Intensity j -0.436*** -0.109** -0.628*** -0.304***
(0.130) (0.046) (0.141) (0.063)
Interactions 
Corruption loc-country, y * Certificate Intensity j * Size 0.035* 0.040***
(0.020) (0.009)
Corruption country, y * Certificate Intensity j * Size 0.047** 0.046***
(0.023) (0.011)
Firm-Level Controls"" Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legal and Industry-Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,919 4,919 9,570 9,570 4,919 4,919 9,570 9,570
R
2
0.17 0.18 0.33 0.33 0.17 0.18 0.33 0.33
Services Manufacturing Services Manufacturing
Dependent Variable: Quality Certificates
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Table 7: The impacts of corruption on machinery investment 
  
Note: Industry fixed effects are at the 2-digit ISIC Rev. 3 level. Region fixed effects account for whether the firm is located in i) the capital 
city or areas ii) with more than 1 million inhabitants, iii) with 250,000 to 1 million inhabitants, iv) with 50,000 to 250,000 inhabitants or v) 
with less than 50,000 inhabitants. Standard errors clustered by country, location, industry and year for columns (1), (3) and  (5) and country, 
industry and year for columns (2), (4) and (6) in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Firm- and industry-level controls are the same reported for columns (4) and (5) of Table 2. 
 
  
Dependent Variables: Machinery Investment Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corruption 
Corruption loc-country, y * Physical Capital Intensity j -0.991* -1.061
(0.562) (0.650)
Corruption country, y * Physical Capital Intensity j -1.449** -1.696**
(0.681) (0.743)
Interactions 
Corruption loc-country, y * Physical Capital Intensity j * Size 0.018
(0.089)
Corruption country, y * Physical Capital Intensity j * Size 0.064
(0.100)
Corruption loc-country,y * Physical Capital Intensity j * Small -1.040*
(0.567)
Corruption country,y * Physical Capital Intensity j * Small -1.556**
(0.662)
Corruption loc-country,y * Physical Capital Intensity j * Median -0.866
(0.579)
Corruption country,y * Physical Capital Intensity j * Median -1.268*
(0.680)
Corruption loc-country,y * Physical Capital Intensity j * Large -1.572**
(0.641)
Corruption country,y * Physical Capital Intensity j * Large -1.931***
(0.742)
P-Value for Difference in Coefficients Small-Large 0.14 0.31
Firm-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Business Environment Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,850 10,850 10,850 10,850 10,850 10,850
R
2
0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
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Table 8: The impact of trust on certificate ownership 
  
Note: Industry fixed effects are at the 2-digit ISIC Rev. 3 level. Region fixed effects account for whether the firm is located in i) the capital 
city or areas ii) with more than 1 million inhabitants, iii) with 250,000 to 1 million inhabitants, iv) with 50,000 to 250,000 inhabitants or v) 
with less than 50,000 inhabitants. Standard errors clustered by country, location, industry and year for columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) and 
country, industry and year for columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) in parentheses.. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. Firm- and industry-level controls are the same reported for columns (4) and (5) of Table 2. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corruption 
Trust loc-country, y * Certificate Intensity j 0.593*** 0.172
(0.115) (0.118)
Trust country, y * Certificate Intensity j 0.924*** 0.441***
(0.128) (0.140)
Interactions 
Trust loc-country, y * Certificate Intensity j * Size 0.077***
(0.008)
Trust country, y * Certificate Intensity j * Size 0.076***
(0.010)
Trust loc-country,y * Certificate Intensity j * Small 0.480***
(0.113)
Trust country,y *Certificate Intensity j * Small 0.770***
(0.130)
Trust loc-country,y * Certificate Intensity j * Median 0.578***
(0.112)
Trust country,y * Certificate Intensity j * Median 0.867***
(0.128)
Trust loc-country,y * Certificate Intensity j * Large 0.673***
(0.114)
Trust country,y * Certificate Intensity j * Large 0.959***
(0.128)
P-Value for Difference in Coefficients Small-Large 0.00 0.00
Firm-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Business Environment Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,104 11,104 11,104 11,104 11,104 11,104
R
2
0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34
Dependent Variable: Quality Certificates
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Table 9: The impact of IP intensity on the corruption-certificate-ownership relationship 
 
Note: Industry fixed effects are at the 2-digit ISIC Rev. 3 level. Region fixed effects account for whether the firm is located in i) the capital 
city or areas ii) with more than 1 million inhabitants, iii) with 250,000 to 1 million inhabitants, iv) with 50,000 to 250,000 inhabitants or v) 
with less than 50,000 inhabitants. Standard errors clustered by country, location, industry and year for column (1) and country, industry and 
year for column (2) in parentheses.. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Firm- and industry-level 
controls are the same reported for columns (4) and (5) of Table 2. 
 
  
(1) (2)
Corruption 
Corruption loc-country, y * Certificate Intensity j -0.137
                  * Q1 IP Intensity (0.128)
Corruption country, y * Certificate Intensity j -0.223
                  * Q1 IP Intensity (0.149)
Corruption loc-country, y * Certificate Intensity j -0.395***
                  * Q2 IP Intensity (0.088)
Corruption country, y * Certificate Intensity j -0.491***
                 * Q2 IP Intensity (0.103)
Corruption loc-country, y * Certificate Intensity j -0.250***
                 * Q3 IP Intensity (0.070)
Corruption country, y * Certificate Intensity j -0.320***
                 * Q3 IP Intensity (0.083)
Corruption loc-country, y * Certificate Intensity j -0.198***
                 *Q4 IP Intensity (0.056)
Corruption country, y * Certificate Intensity j -0.275***
                 * Q4 IP Intensity (0.065)
P-Value for Difference in Coefficients Q1-Q2 0.06 0.12
P-Value for Difference in Coefficients Q1-Q3 0.42 0.55
P-Value for Difference in Coefficients Q1-Q4 0.65 0.75
Interactions 
Corruption loc-country, y * Certificate Intensity j 0.007
                 * Q1 IP Intensity * Size (0.027)
Corruption country, y * Certificate Intensity j 0.012
                 * Q1 IP Intensity * Size (0.028)
Corruption loc-country, y*Certificate Intensity j 0.048***
                 * Q2 IP Intensity * Size (0.017)
Corruption country, y * Certificate Intensity j 0.056***
                 * Q2 IP Intensity * Size (0.019)
Corruption loc-country, y * Certificate Intensity j 0.065***
                 * Q3 IP Intensity * Size (0.012)
Corruption country, y * Certificate Intensity j 0.071***
                 * Q3 IP Intensity * Size (0.015)
Corruption loc-country, y * Certificate Intensity j 0.030***
                 * Q4 IP Intensity * Size (0.010)
Corruption country, y * Certificate Intensity j 0.035***
                 * Q4 IP Intensity * Size (0.012)
Firm-Level Controls Yes Yes
Controls for Business Environment Conditions Yes Yes
Country-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 9,954 9,954
R
2
0.33 0.33
Dependent Variable: Quality Certificates
37 
 
Appendix Table 1: Description of computation of variables used 
 
Note: Statistics reported are computed on the basis of the baseline estimation survey, except for industry and country-location and country-
level indicators where averages are provided for industry, country-location and country respectively. Unless otherwise specified indicators 
are obtained using the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.    
Variable Name Description Mean Std. Dev.
IP Ownership 
Quality Certificates A dummy equal to one if the establishment has an internationally-recognized quality certification, such as ISO 9000 or 
14000 certifications.
24.5%
Patents A dummy equal to one if the establishment has a registered patent and zero otherwise. 9.6%
Corruption and Trust
Corruption Average share of establishments that indicated an informal gift or payment was needed to obtain an operating license by 
country-location or country in a given year.
13.3% 
(13.2%)
0.11 
(0.10)
Subjective Corruption Average of firms' perception of corruption as an obstacle to their current business operations by country-region in a given 
year. The scale provided to firms includes 5 categories: 0 (no obstacle), 1 (minor obstacle), 2 (moderate obstacle), 3 (major 
obstacle), 4 (very severe obstacle).  
1.64    
(1.62)
0.76 
(0.73)
Trust Average share of establishments' sales paid for after delivery by country-location or country in a given year. 54.1% 0.17 
Measures of Industry Intensity
Certificate Intensity Average share of establishments holding certificates by industry for the full 2006-2011 establishment sample of the World 
Bank Enterprise Survey. 
0.28 0.14
Patent Intensity Industry-specific US patent intensity obtained by dividing the fractional patent counts
by nominal value added in million US dollars. Source: Aghion et al. (2013)
0.04 0.04
Alternative Patent Intensity Industry share of utility patents over total utility patents deposited at USPTO for 2004-2008. Source: ESA-USPTO (2012) 0.04 0.07
Trademark Intensity Share of community trademark applications by French firms in 2005 over the total number of applications. Source: Millot 
(2012)
1.8% 0.25
R&D Intensity Measure of R&D intensity by 2-digit ISIC sector computed as the share of sectoral R&D investment over total R&D 
investments for the United States for 2000-2010. Source: OECD STAN Database. 
0.07 0.10
Financial Dependence Measure of external financial dependence by industry computed as ratio of capital expenditures minus cash flow from 
operations to capital expenditures of US firms for 1986-1995 using Compustat's Annual Industrial files. Source: Braun 
(2003)
0.30 0.33
Asset Tangibility Measure of asset tangibility by industry calculated as the median tangibility of US firms in the 1986-1995 period using 
Compustat's Annual Industrial files. Tangibility is defined as net property, plant and equipment divided by book value of 
assets. Source: Braun (2003)
0.29 0.12
Physical Capital Intensity Measure of physical capital intensity corresponds to the median of the gross fixed capital formation to value added ratio in 
the U.S. for the 1986-1995 period in each industry using Compustat's Annual Industrial files. Source: Braun (2003) 
0.07 0.03
Human Capital Intensity Measure of human capital intensity is the median from 1986 to 1995 of the industry’s mean wage over that of the whole 
manufacturing sector in the U.S for 1986-1995. Source: Braun (2003)
1.02 0.26
Contract Intensity Indicator of contract intensity of industries using the 1997 United States I-O Use Table to identify intermediate input needs 
and information from Rauch (1999) on non-homogeneous sectors as indicating relationship-specific investments. Source: 
Nunn (2007)
0.88 0.14
Firm-Level Variables
Employment  Logarithm of the establishment's full time employment.  3.60 1.44
Age Logarithm of the difference between the year the survey was conducted and the year the firm was created. 2.81 [17] 0.77
Foreign Ownership Status A dummy equal to one if the establishment's share of foreign ownership is bigger or equals to 40% and zero otherwise. 12.4%
Public Ownership Status A dummy equal to one if the government or state own a share of the establishment and zero otherwise. 1.4%
Ownership Concentration Logarithm of the percentage of the firm owned by the largest owner(s). 4.22 
[67.9%]
0.50
Sales Logarithm of the establishment's total sales. 6.83 2.72
Share of Skilled Labor Share of non-production workers in an establishments total full-time employment. 27.0% 0.19
Indicator of Foreign Technology Use Dummy equal to one if the establishment uses technology licensed from a foreign-owned company and zero otherwise. 16.1%
Share of Exports in Total Sales Share of an establishment's total sales that are exported. 13.1% 0.28
Website Ownership A dummy equal to one if a firm communicates with clients and suppliers via its own website and zero otherwise. 48.2%
Labor Productivity Measure computed as the logarithm of the sales to total full-time employment ratio. 5.66 2.42
Machinery Investment Ratio Logarithm of the share of firm i 's investment in machinery over its total employment. 0.87 0.14
Business Condition Controls
Herfindahl Index The normalized Herfindahl Index is computed at the 2-digit ISIC country level. 0.34 0.28
Industry Productivity Average labor productivity by 2-digit ISIC industry-country. 6.69 2.18
Intensity of Foreign Technology Use Average share of firms using technology licensed from a foreign-owned company by 2-digit ISIC industry-country. 18.7% 0.18
GDP per Capita Logarithm of the gross domestic product in USD divided by the mid-year population. Source: World Development 
Indicators. 
7.76 1.02
Rule of Law Measure reflecting perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence.  Source: World Bank World Governance Indicators. 
-0.49 0.71
Control of Corruption Measure reflecting perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.  Source: World Bank World 
Governance Indicators
-0.41 0.68
Voice and Accountability Measure reflecting perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, 
as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.  Source: World Bank Worldwide Governance 
Indicators
-0.19 0.78
Political Stability Measure reflecting perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. Source: World Bank Worldwide Governance 
Indicators
-0.32 0.86
Regulatory Quality Measure reflecting perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations 
that permit and promote private sector development. Source: World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators
-0.19 0.73
Governance Effectiveness Measure reflecting perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. Source: World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators
-0.31 0.62
Trademark Index Indicator of the strength of legal trademark protection for country c  in 2002 which integrates 3 components: i) coverage of 
trademark laws, ii) procedures and enforcement mechanisms and iii) membership in international treaties. See Reynolds 
(2004) for additional detail.Source: Reynolds (2004)
0.55 0.15
Credit Availability Indicator of the average share of firms having a line of credit or a loan from a bank in location l of country c  for year y . 43.6% 
(43.2%)
0.21 
(0.20)
Power Outages Indicator of the share of firms in location l  of country c  experiencing power outages for year y.  42.3% 
(43.1%)
0.21 
(0.20)
Investment Intensity Indicator of the share of machinery investments over total industrial sales in location l  of country c  for year y . 4.6% 
(4.7%)
0.02 
(0.03)
Skills Availability Indicator of the average share of skilled employment over total employment in location l  of country c  for year y . 28.0% 
(27.7%)
0.07 
(0.07)
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Appendix Table 2: Patent and certificate intensities by industry 
Panel A: Certificate intensity 
 
Panel B: Patent intensity  
 
Note: Share of businesses with quality certificates by industry based on 63,203 firm observations for 119 countries. Industry codes 
correspond to the 2-digit ISIC Rev. 3 classification. The construction and services category includes all firms operating in services and 
construction sectors.  
 
  
Industry Code Industry Description Certificate 
Intensity
32 Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 53.2%
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 46.6%
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 44.6%
35 Other transport equipment 43.2%
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 42.9%
16 Tobacco products 41.1%
30 Office, accounting and computing machinery 36.8%
24 Chemicals and chemical products 35.1%
29 Other machinery and equipment 31.8%
25 Rubber and plastics products 31.0%
27 Basic metals 28.6%
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 27.4%
21 Paper and paper products 24.1%
15 Food products and beverages 23.1%
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 20.5%
17 Textiles 16.2%
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 13.1%
20 Wood and products of wood and cork 12.6%
18 Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 11.1%
36 Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. 10.4%
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 9.4%
Industry Code Industry Description Patent 
Intensity
32 Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 25.5%
30 Office, accounting and computing machinery 19.0%
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 11.3%
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 18.7%
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 10.0%
24 Chemicals and chemical products 6.4%
36 Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. 2.3%
25 Rubber and plastics products 1.4%
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 1.4%
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.6%
35 Other transport equipment 0.3%
17 Textiles 0.4%
18 Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 0.4%
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 0.4%
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 0.9%
27 Basic metals 0.2%
21 Paper and paper products 0.2%
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 0.2%
16 Tobacco products 0.0%
15 Food products and beverages 0.2%
20 Wood and products of wood and cork 0.1%
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Appendix Table 3: Robustness   
Panel A: Quality certificates 
 
Panel B: Patents  
  
Note: Industry fixed effects are at the 2-digit ISIC Rev. 3 level. Region fixed effects account for whether the firm is located in i) the capital 
city or areas ii) with more than 1 million inhabitants, iii) with 250,000 to 1 million inhabitants, iv) with 50,000 to 250,000 inhabitants or v) 
with less than 50,000 inhabitants. Clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectively. Firm- and industry-level controls are the same reported for columns (4) and (5) of Table 2. 
 
Subjective 
Corruption
R&D Intensity  
Weights
Trademark 
Weights
Logit Probit Sales-Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corruption 
Corruption Perception country,y * Certificate Intensity j -0.402***
(0.084)
Corruption country,y * R&D Intensity j -0.278***
(0.084)
Corruption country,y * Trademark Intensity j -0.006***
(0.002)
Corruption country,y * Certificate Intensity j -1.328***-0.838*** -0.422***
[-0.105] [-0.122]
(0.510) (0.274) (0.113)
Interactions 
Corruption Perception country,y * Certificate Intensity j * Size 0.090***
(0.016)
Corruption country,y * R&D Intensity j * Size 0.037**
(0.016)
Corruption country,y * Trademark Intensity j * Size 0.001**
(0.000)
Corruption country,y * Certificate Intensity j * Size 0.309*** 0.173***
[0.031] [0.031]
(0.087) (0.047)
Corruption country,y * Certificate Intensity j * Sales-Size 0.014***
(0.005)
Firm-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Business Environment Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,104 11,111 11,111 11,104 11,104 10,389
R
2
0.34 0.33 0.33 0.32
Pseudo-R
2
0.34 0.34
Subjective 
Corruption
R&D Intensity  
Weights
Alternative 
Patent 
Weights
Logit Probit Sales-Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corruption 
Corruption Perception country,y * Patent Intensity j -0.726***
(0.253)
Corruption country,y * R&D Intensity j -0.119
(0.090)
Corruption country,y * Alternative Patent Intensity j -0.455
(0.277)
Corruption country,y * Patent Intensity j -1.156 -0.553 -0.469
[-0.079] [-0.070]
(3.305) (1.658) (0.307)
Interactions 
Corruption Perception country,y * Patent Intensity j * Size 0.153***
(0.051)
Corruption country,y * R&D Intensity j * Size 0.035**
(0.016)
Corruption country,y * Alternative Patent Intensity j * Size 0.064
(0.044)
Corruption country,y * Patent Intensity j * Size 0.246 0.154
[0.017] [0.020]
(0.556) (0.271)
Corruption country,y * Patent Intensity j * Sales-Size 0.023
(0.016)
Firm-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Business Environment Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,850 6,244 6,239 5,845 5,845 5,454
R
2
0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17
Pseudo-R
2
0.28 0.28
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